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The Modern Prima Facie Tort Doctrine
By KENNETH J. VANDEvELDE*
INTRODUCTION
A "nsty shroud" is how some courts,' with considerable justi-
fication, have described the doctrine of prima facie tort. That doc-
trine posits a general theory of intentional tort under which the
intentional infliction of injury without justification is actionable.
Although more than a century old and originally explicated by
tort scholars of no less distinction than Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Frederick Pollock, the prima facie tort doctrine is characterized by
all of the obscurity2 and confusion3 that the metaphor of a misty
shroud suggests. Born of the same impulse that gave rise to the
modem division of tort law into intentional tort, negligent tort and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. B.A. 1975, Uni-
versity of Louisville; J.D. 1979, Harvard University. Thanks to my colleague Bill Patton
for his comments on an earlier draft.
I See, e.g., Kiphart v. Community Federal Savings & Loan Association, 729
S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App. 1987); Brown v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 720 S.W.2d
357 (Mo. banc 1986); Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Mo. banc 1985).
Prosser's treatise devotes only a few lines to the doctnne and does so in a
context which suggests that it is but a species of the tort of intentional interference with
prospective advantage and limited to New York. W KEETON, PRossER AND KEETON ON
Tni LAW OF TORTS 1010-11 (1984). The treatise by Harper, James and Gray discusses
the doctrine only in scattered footnotes. See, e.g., II F HARPER, F JAMES & 0. GRAY,
THE LAw OF TORTS 164-65 n.20; 284 n.40; 294-95 n.2 (2d ed. 1986).
The prima facie tort doctrine is treated with slightly less obscurity by a small
number of the casebooks. I have found one casebook which raises the question whether
prima facie tort is a general theory of intentional tort, but does so only in connection
with the very last case in the book. See M. FANuxLN & B. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIvES 1124-1133 (1987). A second casebook, not knowing
quite where to put it, places prima facie tort in a chapter m the back of the book
entitled "Some Unclassified Torts" See W PROSSER, J. WADE & V SCHWARTz, TORTS-
CASES AND MATERIAUS 1188-1202 (1988). A third casebook includes a couple of cases
discussing the prima facie tort doctnne in a section entitled "The Field of Business,
Competition, and Marketing." See H. ScnmruAN, F JAmms & 0. GRAY, CASES AND
MATERuS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 996-1009 (1976).
As discussed, infra at notes 103-66, the doctrine exists in more than one version.
In general, the two leading formulations are those of New York and the Second Restate-
ment. Some states, however, such as Missouri, have borrowed elements from both
formulations.
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strict liability, the prima facie tort doctrine deserves a better fate.
This essay analyzes the prima facie tort doctrine in its contem-
porary form.4 It is a companion to a separate essay on the history
of the general theory of intentional tort. 5 It surveys the jurisdictions
m which the doctrine has been recognized, examines the elements of
the doctrine as currently recognized by the courts, and attempts to
define the function of a general theory of intentional tort in modem
tort law
As will be seen, the courts over time have developed two distinct
formulations of the prima facie tort do&rme. The formulation fol-
lowed by the great majority of states adheres closely to the theory
articulated by Holmes and Pollock and is now generally identified
4 The literature on the prima facie tort doctrine has been overwhelmingly favor-
able. Most of the commentary, however, dates from the mid-1950's and was prompted
by New York's explicit adoption of the doctrine during the prior decade. Thus, it is
heavily oriented toward New York case law. See Brown, The Rise and Threatened
Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw U.L. Rv 563 (1959); Forkosch, An
Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1957);
Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 7 (1957); Ward,
The Tort Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 28 (1956); Note, The Prima Facie Tort
Doctrine, 52 CoLUM. L. Rv 503 (1952); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New
York-Another Writ?, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv 530 (1968); Note, Abstaining From Willful
Injury-The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv 53 (1958).
A second, smaller wave of favorable commentary appeared in the early 1980's,
contemporaneously with the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
Missouri's adoption of the doctrine. See Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: Ac-
knowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of Malice, 63 B.U.L. Rv 1001 (1983);
Note, Prima Facie Tort, 11 Cuam. L. Rnv 113 (1980); Note, Prima Facie Tort Recog-
nized in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REv 553 (1982); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine to
Injure May Result in Liability, 50 UMKC L. Rv 128 (1981).
More recent literature addresses the prima facie tort doctrine as a basis for liability
in very specific contexts. This commentary is mixed. For example, the prima facie tort
doctrine has been praised as a basis for compensating wrongfully discharged at-will
employees. See, e.g., Squire, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine and a Social Justice Theory:
Are They a Response to the Employment At-Will Rule?, 51 U. PrTT. L. REv 641 (1990).
Two recent articles, on the other hand, have criticized use of the doctrine as a basis
for lender liability. See Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Concep-
tual Framework, 40 Sw L.J. 775, 800 (1986) (criticizing the doctrine as "unpredicta-
ble"); Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Applications of Old
Concepts, 104 BxrNo L.J. 492, 501 (1987) (calling the doctrine "specious").
Another commentator has criticized the prima facie tort doctrine as a general theory
of liability on the ground that it brings uncertainty to the law, although he appears to
believe the Second Restatement to be an improvement over the First Restatement. See
Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, 34 ARK. L. Rnv 335, 345-46
(1980). For a discussion of the First Restatement's formulation of the doctrine, see infra
note 28.
See Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General
Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFsTRA L. Rnv - (1991).
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with the Second Restatement. The other formulation, developed by
the courts of New York, includes additional requirements that the
conduct be motivated solely by malice, not be otherwise actionable,
and result in special damages.
I. ORIGINS OF THE PRIMA FACIE TORT DOcTRIE
Understanding the modem prima facie tort doctrine requires
some familiarity with the major themes in the development of the
doctrine. Without attempting to repeat in detail the story told else-
where, 6 this section summarizes these major themes.
In the late nineteenth century, two competing schemes for organ-
izing tort law. emerged. One scheme, which is associated with Thomas
Cooley, organized tort law as a set of remedies for the invasion of
various rights.7 That is, certain rights preexisted the law 8 Tort law
was the collection of recognized causes of action through which one
could obtain compensation for interference with those rights.
Although it is hard now to imagine such a system, Cooley's
scheme did not regard the defendant's state of mind as an important
organizing principle. Conduct was actionable if it invaded a right
and caused injury 9 While he occasionally discussed the defendant's
state of mind in connection with a particular tort, he did not discuss
that subject systematically or in any general way, except to deny the
importance of the defendant's motive, which he equated with intent.10
Cooley's scheme was essentially formalist. He argued that a judge
could determine the extent of tort liability by reasoning from the
prnciples of earlier decisions."1 Under these principles, certain con-
duct was inherently unlawful because it invaded the rights of another.
The defendant's evil motive was Irrelevant.
The competing and ultimately prevailing scheme was largely the
creation of Oliver Wendell Holmes. To Holmes, the fundamental
concept of tort law was not right, but duty. Tort law imposed certain
duties on persons for reasons of public policy.
6 Vandevelde, supra note 5. The following section summarizes portions of the
essay cited supra note 5. That essay contains supporting references for the unfootnoted
assertions herein.
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON Tim LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 23-47, 64-73 (1886).
8 Id. at 13-14.
9 Id. at 66.
10 Id. at 830-32.
" Id. at 12-13.
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In his early writings on tort law, primarily his 1881 book, The
Common Law, Holmes organized tort law into the categories of
liability without fault, negligence, and intentional tort. 12 In the first
category, the law imposed an absolute duty to avoid causing injury.
In the latter categories, the law imposed the duty to avoid only harm
that was foreseeable (negligence) or foreseeable with substantial cer-
tainty (intentional tort)."
Holmes's scheme differed from Cooley's in that it recognized the
defendant's state of mind as the fundamental organizing principle of
tort law The state of mind that was relevant was the defendant's
foreknowledge that harm would result from his conduct. The fore-
seeability of harm, however, was measured by an objective standard
that asked whether an "average man" would have foreseen (or
foreseen with substantial certainty) that his conduct would cause
injury. 4 That is, liability was not based on the defendant's actual
moral blameworthiness, but on considerations of policy Thus, by
defining the defendant's state of mind objectively, Holmes, like
Cooley, eliminated personal moral blameworthiness as an element of
tort liability
Holmes acknowledged that some intentional torts did seem to
require actual malice, i.e., an evil motive. He argued, however, that
m most cases malice was a form of intent, which, as already noted,
was defined objectively. Holmes thus concurred with Cooley in equat-
ing motive and intent. By that device, he reached the conclusion that
even explicitly malicious torts were not based on personal morality
Holmes's scheme was instrumentalist, not formalist. Tort liability
was not derived by reasoning from principle, but imposed by the
state for policy reasons. Over a period of several decades, Holmes's
tripartite scheme gamed widespread acceptance as the basis for or-
ganizmg modem tort law.
Holmes's early discussions of his tort theory recognized an os-
tensibly general theory of negligence, but not of intentional tort. In
his view, intentional torts consisted of a series of discrete, long-
established causes of action, including libel and slander, malicious
prosecution, conspiracy, and fraud. 15
Most other scholars, although they disagreed with Holmes over
which were the intentional torts, accepted his premise that negligence
12 Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REv. 652, 653 (1873).
3 0. HoLmEs, TiE CommoN LAw 104, 116-17 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
"4 Id. at 87, 117
11 Id. at 109-14.
[VOL. 79
PRiu FACt TORT DoCTUNE
was a general theory of tort, while intentional tort was a set of
relatively narrow causes of action. In an 1886 treatise, however,
Frederick Pollock proposed that there was also a general theory of
intentional tort.16 Specifically, he asserted that it was "a general
proposition of English law that it is a wrong to do wilful harm to
one's neighbor without lawful justification or excuse, 1' 7 though he
admitted that there was no express English authority for ths prop-
osition.
Eight years later, writing his influential article, "Privilege, Malice
and Intent,"' 8 Holmes agreed with Pollock's thesis. Holmes wrote
that "the intentional infliction of temporal damage, or the doing of
an act manifestly likely to inflict such damage and inflicting it, is
actionable if done without just cause. ' 19 The thesis of both men thus
was that the intentional infliction of injury without justification is
actionable. They proposed, in other words, the modem doctrine of
prima facie tort.
Holmes's 1894 article reflected several important shifts in his tort
theory, in addition to his embrace of a general theory of intentional
tort. First, he began to distinguish between motive and intent, the
former signifying the reasons for the defendant's conduct and the
latter the extent to which harm was foreseeable as a consequence of
that conduct. Second, Holmes came to the realization that malice
was not an extreme degree of intent, but a form of motive. Third,
he decided that motive, including malice, could be considered by the
court in determining whether intentionally injurious conduct was
without justification, i.e., whether it was actionable. In short, Holmes
proposed a subjective standard for justification.
A general theory of intentional tort already had been recognized
in at least one Massachusetts case2° and, after his appointment to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the U.S. Supreme
Court, Holmes authored several opinions in which he attempted to
write the doctrine into law 21 The most influential of these was Aikens
6 F POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON TH LAW OF ToRTS (1886).
17 Id. at 22-23 (Webb ed. 1894). The text of the 1894 edition was identical to that
of the 1886 English edition.
" Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv L. REv 1 (1894).
Id. at 3.
See Walker v. Cromn, 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
21 See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350 (1921);
Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904); Moran v. Dunphy, 59 N.E. 125 (Mass. 1901);
Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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v Wisconsin,22  which Is opinion for the court upheld a state
statute prohibiting two or more persons from combining for the
purpose of willfully or maliciously injuring another in his trade or
business. In Aikens, Holmes penned his most widely-quoted formu-
lation of his general theory of intentional tort: "It has been consid-
ered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage
is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever
may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant
is to escape.'' 23 Holmes's judicial opinions reflected his view, previ-
ously expressed in "Privilege, Malice and Intent," that the test for
foreseeability was objective, while that for justification was subjec-
tive.
Decisions in other states also began to recognize a general theory
of intentional tort, following closely along the lines proposed by
Holmes and Pollock.2 Most cases involved actions by employers
against labor unions engaged in picketing, boycotts, or other labor
activity, or actions by small businesses against powerful competitors.
These cases also adopted a subjective standard of justification.
In 1923, the New York courts decided the first of what would
become hundreds of decisions applying the prima facie tort doctrine
to a wide variety of situations.-5 A 1946 New York decision gave the
doctrine the name "prima facie tort."' ' The New York decisions,
however, added three qualifications to the doctrine, which consider-
ably limited the range of conduct for which liability could be m-
posed.27
2 195 U.S. 194.
2 Id. at 204.
24 See, e.g., Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 105 F 163,
167-71 (8th Cir. 1900) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Connors v. Connolly, 86 A. 600 (Conn.
1913); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 132 N.W 37 (Iowa 1911); Tuttle v Buck, 119
N.W 946 (Minn. 1909); Mangum Elec. Co. v. Border, 222 P 1002 (Okla. 1923); Hutton
v. Watters, 179 S.W 134 (Tenn. 1915).
21 Beardsley v. Kilmer, 140 N.E. 203 (N.Y. 1923). A Westlaw search conducted in
June 1990 identified 474 cases decided since 1946 in which the phrase "prima facie tort"
appeared.
26 Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 70 N.E.2d 401, 403 (N.Y.
1946). The name was derived from Holmes' famous description of the doctrine in Aikens.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Morrison v. National Broadcasting
Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y 1965) (recogmzing prima facie tort doctrine but distin-
guishing facts).
For other New York prima facie tort cases decided between 1923 and 1946, see
American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 36 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y 1941); Opera on
Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 34 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1941); Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 191
N.E. 713 (N.Y. 1934).
27 See infra notes 107-55 and accompanying text.
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In 1979, the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted section 870,
which sets forth a general principle of liability for intended harm
quite similar to the doctrine formulated by Pollock and Holmes. 28
Most states recogize section 870 as the definitive statement of the
modem prima facie tort doctnne. 29
II. TE CoNTEMPoRARY SCOPE OF PRnmA FACIo TORT
A. Geographical Scope of Recognition
Courts in about half the states have addressed the issue of
whether to adopt the prima facie tort doctrine. Of those, the over-
whelming majority have held that the doctrine is law in that juris-
diction.
Courts have recognized the prima facie tort doctrine in Arizona, 0
Califorma, 31 Connecticut, 32 Delaware,33 the District of Columbia,3
21 The First Restatement contained a counterpart § 870 that formulated the prima
facie tort doctnne quite differently than Holmes, Pollock, the Second Restatement, or
any significant number of states. More specifically, the First Restatement version im-
posed liability under the prima facie tort doctrine only if the defendant's conduct was
tortious under some other section. It, therefore, stated no new principle of liability, but
in effect only summarized existing principles. The First Restatement's formulation has
had little impact on the case law or on tort theory generally and thus is disregarded
here. See Vandevelde, supra note 5, at _.
29 See, e.g., Rutledge v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 715 P.2d 1243 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986); Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Schmitz v.
Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1990); Haller v. Borror Corp., 552 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio
1990); Smith v. Griffiths, 476 A.2d 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Even New York, which
had adopted the prima facie tort doctrine decades before the Second Restatement was
written, has looked to § 870 of the Second Restatement for guidance. See Burns v.
Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y 1983).
10 Lewis v..Swenson, 617 P.2d 69, 74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (citing § 870 of the
Second Restatement, but finding it inapplicable to the facts). But see State v. Bolt, 689
P.2d 519, 527 (Ariz. 1984) (referring to the fact that "other states" have recognized the
prima facie tort doctrine, implying that it is not recognized in Arizona).
31 Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 642 F Supp. 1357, 1418 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (applying California law to find FBI liable for prima facie tort in its efforts to
disrupt the Socialist Workers Party); Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445
n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (citing with approval Holmes' statement of the prima facie
tort doctrine in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904), and applying the doctrine to
interference with livelihood). But see City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38,
726 P.2d 538, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856 (Cal. 1986) (rejecting prima facie tort to the extent
that it creates a cause of action for damages by a municipality against illegal strikers).
Cf. San Luis Obispo County v. Abalone Alliance, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846, 855 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (rejecting the concept of a "umversal duty" and acknowledging that "in
some circumstances the infliction of damage, though intentional, is without legal rem-
edy"). Abalone Alliance is not inconsistent with the prima facie tort doctrine because
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Idaho," Illinois, 6 Massachusetts,37 Missouri, 8 New Jersey, 39 New
Mexico, 40 Ohlo,4' 1 Oklahoma, 42 Pennsylvama, 43 South Dakota,44 Ten-
the latter recognizes that some injuries are not legally cognizable and thus does not posit
a "universal duty" to avoid unjustified, intentional injury.
11 McAnerney v. McAnerney, 334 A.2d 437, 441 (Conn. 1973) (declining to find
prima facie tort under the facts, but suggesting that the tort is recognized in Connecti-
cut); Connors v. Connolly, 86 A. 600, 602 (Conn. 1913) (following Aikens).
11 Newell Co. v. Win. E. Wright Co., 500 A.2d 974, 981 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1985)
(dicta); Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369, 373 (Del. Ch. 1978) (recognizing doctrine,
but finding that defendant's conduct in bringing an action for stock appraisal was
justified); Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407, 412 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (recognizing doctrine,
but finding defendant's conduct in bringing a prior lawsuit to be justified).
34 Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F Supp. 146, 149 (D.D.C. 1980) (appearing
to recognize the tort, but finding it preempted by a federal statute on the facts before
the court). But see Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 577 F Supp. 182, 184
(D.D.C. 1983) (observing that the "District of Columbia courts have not embraced a
form of generic tort like the prima facie tort recognized by New York courts").
3, White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986) (dictum).
36 Lowe Found. v. Northern Trust Co., 96 N.E.2d 831 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951) (ap-
plying § 870 of the First Restatement to find liability for intentional interference with
an expectancy under a will); Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 89 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ill. App. Ct.
1949) (applying the principles of several early prima facie tort cases to hold that the
painter of President Truman's portrait had a cause of action against a magazine which
falsely represented that another artist had painted the first portrait of that president).
But see Barry Gilberg, Ltd. v. Craftex Corp., 665 F Supp. 585, 596 (N.D. II. 1987)
(concluding that Illinois would not elect to recognize prima facie tort under the facts
before the court).
37 Frontier Management Co. v. Balboa Ins. Co., 658 F Supp. 987, 994 (D. Mass.
1986); Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1948); Owen v. Williams,
77 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Mass. 1948); Saveall v. Demes, 76 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Mass. 1947);
Robitaille v. Morse, 186 N.E. 78, 79 (Mass. 1933); Moran v. Dunphy, 59 N.E. 125, 126
(Mass. 1901); see also Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1014 (Mass. 1900).
1' Greco v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Dowd v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 685 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing the
doctrine but denying recovery); State v. Kansas City Firefighters Local 42, 672 S.W.2d
99, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing doctrine, although denying recovery to plaintiff
on that theory); Bandag of Springfield, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing the doctrine but holding that plaintiff could not rely on it
if a "well-defined nominate tort cause of action" is available); Porter v. Crawford &
Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (unjustified stop of payment on check
actionable as prima facie tort).
1, Socialist Workers Party, 642 F Supp. at 1418 (applying New Jersey law to find
FBI liable for prima facie tort in its efforts to disrupt the Socialist Workers Party);
Trautwein v. Harbourt, 123 A.2d 30, 40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (recognizing
doctrine, but holding that defendants were justified in excluding plaintiffs from a
voluntary association).
40 Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 734 (N.M. 1990) (bank committed prima
facie tort against borrower by wrongfully seeking collection on note).
41 Haler v. Borror Corp., 552 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio 1990) (recognizing doctrine, but
finding it inapplicable to the facts presented).
42 Mangum Elec. Co. v. Border, 222 P 1002 (Okla. 1923) (physician had cause of
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nessee,45 Puerto Rico,4 and the Virgin Islands. 47 The tort apparently
has been recognized in Hawaii,48 Kentucky,49 Mane,50 Minnesota,5
and Montana, 52 although these states have applied the prima facie
tort doctrine to a relatively specific situation, leaving it unclear how
broadly applicable the doctrine is.
Federal courts have assumed that the tort would be recognized
in Georg 53 and Virgima. 4 Oregon has recognized the doctrine as a
general principle of liability, although it decided not to adopt the
doctrine as a "specific tort category. '
55
action against defendants who attempted to induce him to perform a criminal abortion
in order to damage his reputation and lessen his influence on a controversial bond issue).
43 Smith v. Griffiths, 476 A.2d 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (recognizing prima facie
tort, but finding no allegation of intent and that defendant lawyer's conduct in advising
client was justified in any event).
' Blote v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 422 N.W.2d 834, 837 (S.D. 1988)
(acknowledging the prma facie tort doctrine, but refusing to apply it to compensate a
discharged at-will employee).
41 Large v. Dick, 343 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tenn. 1960) (action by labor umon in
threatening to picket actionable as a priima facie tort); Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W
134, 135 (Tenn. 1915) (defendants' efforts, motivated by ill will to drive boarding house
out of business by threatemng boarders, were actionable).
4 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Almodovar, 671 F Supp. 851, 879-80 (D.P.R.
1987) (applying pnma facie tort doctrine to transactions defrauding creditors).
47 Moore v. A.H. Riise Gift Shops, 659 F Supp. 1417, 1426 (D.V.I. 1987) (rec-
ognizing doctrine, but finding that plaintiff had failed to plead facts with sufficient
clarity to state claim).
41 Guiliam v. Chuck, 620 P.2d 733, 738 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (adopting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 (1979), "Intentional Harm to a Property Interest," a
particularized application of prima facie tort).
41 Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 181, 254 S.W.2d
335, 337 (Ky. 1952) (discussing labor picketing as.a prima facie tort).
"o Harmon v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Me. 1979) (following the prima
facie tort doctrne as enunciated in the RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 870 and holding
that one is entitled to recover damages for a tortious interference with receipt of a gift
or specific profit from a transaction).
11 Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W 946 (Minn. 1909) (plaintiff stated a cause of action
against a wealthy defendant who set up a competing barber shop for the sole purpose
of driving the plaintiff out of business).
52 Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970, 977 (Mont. 1982) (refernng to a "prima
facie tort" arising from an insurance company's bad faith act).
" Tully v. Pate, 372 F Supp. 1064, 1071, 1076 (D.S.C. 1973) (under Georgia law,
prima facie tort doctrine creates cause of action for interference with burial rights over
the bodies of deceased children and with the right to attend the funeral of a member of
the immediate family).
-1' Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Say. & Loan, 639 F Supp. 643, 653 (E.D.
Va. 1986) (assuming arguendo that Virgima would recognize prima facie tort, but finding
it inapplicable to the facts before the court).
11 Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 514 (Or. 1975); see also Top Serv. Body Shop,
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1370, 1371 (Or. 1978).
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Alabama56 and Alaska have expressly declined to reach the issue
of whether prima facie tort doctrine is recognized. Where state courts
have not had an opportunity to rule, some federal courts also have
been reluctant to determine whether a state would recognize the
prima facie tort.5 8 The doctrine has been rejected by courts in Indiana59
and Texas.60
B. The Elements of Prima Facie Tort
1. The Restatement Formulation
The modem doctrine of prima facie tort, particularly as formu-
lated by the Second Restatement, 61 differs little from the doctrine
first articulated by Pollock, Holmes, and the Massachusetts courts.
A prima facie tort is the intentional infliction of injury without
justification 2 In the language of the Second Restatement, "one who
intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the
other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not
justifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed
although the actor's conduct does not come within a traditional
category of tort liability "63
A prima facie tort thus contains the following elements: (1) the
intent to injure the plaintiff, (2) without justification, and (3) the
defendant's act which causes (4) injury Each of these elements can
be defined with greater particularity
a. The Intent to Injure
The first element is an intent to injure the plaintiff.64 This element
is satisfied where the defendant "knows or believes that the conse-
56 Polytec, Inc. v. Utah Foam Prods., Inc., 439 So. 2d 683, 689 (Ala. 1983).
11 Lull v. Wick Constr. Co., 614 P.2d 321, 325 n.9 (Alaska 1980). But see City of
Angoon v. Hodel, 836 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that Alaska would
not adopt the doctrine of prima facie tort).
11 See, e.g., Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 668 F Supp. 461, 468 (D. Md. 1987);
Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1985).
1' Soltes v. School City of E. Chicago, 344 N.E.2d 865, 867 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976).
Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 772-73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
62 The Second Restatement generally is regarded as articulating the doctrine in its
contemporary form. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
62 See generally Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 268; Schmitz, 785 P.2d at 726.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979).
6'4 It has been suggested that the only intent necessary is an infent to commit the
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quence is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act." 65
In other words, the element of intent does not require that the
defendant have wished to cause injury or acted with the purpose of
causing injury, but only that the defendant have acted with substan-
tial certainty that injury would occur.
b. The Absence of Justification
The second element is that the defendant have acted without
justification. Determining whether this element is met necessitates
weighing the value of the interests promoted by the defendant's
conduct against the injury caused. 6 The court must weigh not only
the private interests of the parties, but the public interest as well.67
Interests that are the bases of established privileges, such as self-
defense, are significant factors in deterrmng whether the conduct
is justified. 61
If public policy seeks to encourage, or at least not discourage,
the defendant's conduct, then the plaintiff's injury is held justified.69
For example, a merchant may charge a low price for his goods,
knowing that this will injure the trade of his competitors, because
public policy supports economic competition. The injury is justified
and thus not actionable.70
Where the conduct on which the plaintiff's claim is based falls
within another tort, many of the issues concerning when such conduct
is justifiable may have been resolved by prior case law 7' For example,
where the defendant has intentionally inflicted bodily injury, it is
generally settled that self-defense is a justification.7 2
act. See Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra note 4, at 505; Note, Prima Facie
Tort Recognized in Missouri, supra note 4, at 557-58. These commentaries are flawed,
however, because they confuse motive and intent. For a discussion of the distinction,
see Vandevelde, supra note 5. This view, in any event, is contrary to the case law. See,
e.g., Rooney v. National Super Mkt., Inc., 668 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Dowd, 685 S.W.2d at 868; Schmitz, 785 P.2d at 726.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment b; see also Kansas City Fire-
fighters, 672 S.W.2d at 112.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment g; see also Note, The Prima
Facie Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of Malice, supra
note 4, at 1106; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra note 4, at 509; Note,
Abstaining from Willful Injury, supra note 4, at 59-60.
6, See Kaye, 395 A.2d at 373; Forkosch, supra note 4, at 482.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment g.
69 As Justice Holmes explained in Aikens, 195 U.S. at 204, "justifications may
vary in extent according to the principle of policy upon which they are founded. "
10 DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 419 A.2d 942, 947 (Del. Ch. 1980).
11 Halpern, supra note 4, at 11.
72 Id. at 12; see also W KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 124 (1984).
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To the extent that limitations on other torts reflect judgments
about the relative importance of competing interests m a particular
case, there is no reason why those judgments should be changed in
a like case merely because the cause of action has a different name.7
On the other hand, where the limitations are a matter of histoncal
accident or reflect policies that are no longer Important, at least m
the case sub judice, they need not be followed.7 4 No two cases, of
course, are identical and, to the extent that the litigants can dem-
onstrate that a novel case requires a different balancing of interests
than was struck in similar cases, the prima facie tort doctrine provides
the framework to reach a different result.75
Although the plaintiff generally bears the burden of proving that
the defendant's conduct was not justified, the Second Restatement
suggests that, where the absence of justification rests upon a long-
recognized privilege on which the defendant bears the burden of
proof, the defendant should bear the burden of proof as to that
element.76 The plaintiff would show only the absence of any other
justification, leaving it to the defendant to plead and prove the
traditional affirmative defenses.77
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment j; see, e.g., Nix, 466 A.2d at
407 (same policies that precluded recovery under theories of abuse of process and
"malicious prosecution justified defendant's conduct, precluding recovery under a prima
facie tort theory); Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 148
N.Y.S.2d 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) (prima facie tort would not lie because conduct
not actionable as malicious prosecution); Friedman v. Roseth Corp., 74 N.Y.S.2d 733
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (same); cf. Khaury v. Playboy Pub., Inc., 430 F Supp. 1342, 1346
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defamation statute of limitations applied to prima facie tort claim
where latter was based on the same injury to reputation).
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment j; see also National Nutritional
Foods Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F Supp. 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("T]he prima facie
tort doctrine serves the useful function of providing an alternative rationale for relief
in the event some technicality or another unimportant shortcoming prevents relief under
the traditional rubric.").
71 Brown, supra note 4, at 569; Halpern, supra note 4, at 13; cf. Green, Protection
of Trade Regulations Under Tort Law, 47 VA. L. REv 559, 571 (1961) ("[L]ittle would
be gained by substituting the 'prima facie tort' for the traditional tort doctnnes.").
16 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 870 comment j; see also Bandag of Spring-
field, Inc., 662 S.W.2d at 555; Wilt v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 629 S.W.2d
669, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
One commentator suggests that the burden of proving justification always rests on
the defendant. See Forkosch, supra note 4, at 475.
Another commentator suggests that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving ab-
sence of justification if the defendant's conduct is ordinarily regarded as proper. See
Halpern, supra note 4, at 8. It is unclear whether Halpern believes the defendant's
conduct should be presumed proper or whether the defendant has the burden of estab-
lishing that fact.
" This is but an application of the general rule, described supra notes 71-75, that
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Justification in theory can be measured by either an objective or
a subjective standard. An objective standard measures justification
according to the social costs and benefits of the conduct, regardless
of the defendant's actual reasons for her conduct. Under an objective
standard, an intentionally injurious action taken out of sheer malev-
olence can be justified if it incidentally promotes some other interests.
An objective standard thus disregards the defendant's actual motive
for the injurious act. A subjective standard measures justification
according to the defendant's actual reasons for her conduct, including
any ill will or malevolence.
The Second Restatement adopts a test that is both objective and
subjective. Specifically, the Second Restatement requires that conduct
be "generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances. '78
Comment e explains that conduct is generally culpable if it is "im-
proper or wrongful," meaning "blameworthy" or "not m accord
with community standards of right conduct. ' 79 Factors to be consid-
ered in making this determination include the nature and seriousness
of the harm, the means used by the defendant, and the defendant's
motive. 0 Whether the defendant's conduct is justified depends pri-
marily on the nature and significance of the interests promoted by
the defendant's conduct.8' The Second Restatement, in other words,
permits the defendant's actual motives as well as the social costs and
benefits of the defendant's conduct to be considered in determining
whether the injury was "justified" in Holmes's sense of the word. 2
As the comments make clear, the factors suggesting general
culpability are weighed in a single balancing process along with those
suggesting an absence of justification.8 3 Stated differently, the court
makes "one single determination" that the defendant's conduct is
generally culpable and not justified under the circumstances. 84
the prima facie tort doctrine, to the extent that it applies to conduct traditionally
constituting another tort, should reflect the same policy judgments made in adjudicating
the other tort.
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870.
79 Id. at comment e.
90 Id.
81 Id.
S2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 870. For example, comment i observes that
"[t]he nature of the motive may be a factor that tips the scales in determining
whether liability should be imposed or not." (Emphasis added.) Again, it is not necessary
that the defendant had an improper motive, and even if he did, the motive is but one
factor to consider. See also Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 269 (suggesting that, in determining
whether an injurious act was justified, the court will look at the various purposes for
that act).




The relevance of the defendant's subjective motive to the justi-
fication element of the prima facie tort doctrine distinguishes the
general theory of intentional tort from negligence. In negligence
theory, the social desirability of the defendant's conduct, i.e., its
reasonableness, is measured by an objective standard.85 Under the
prima facie tort doctrine, however, a combined objective and sub-
jective standard is used to take the defendant's actual motives into
account.
Because it takes the defendant's subjective state of mind into
account, the prima facie tort doctrine has been criticized on the
ground that it punishes the defendant for her evil motive. s6 This view
has led some courts to refuse to apply the doctrine.87 The prima
facie tort doctrine also has been defended by some commentators
for the same reason: it renders malice actionable.88
Resistance to punishing malice has deep roots in modem tort
theory Despite their fundamental difference on other elements of
tort theory, both Cooley and Holmes argued that motive was irrel-
evant in establishing tort liability
Cooley regarded the law of torts as a collection of causes of
action that remedied injuries to particular rights. Conduct that vio-
lated these rights and caused injury was wrongful. That is, certain
conduct was inherently wrongful because it violated the plaintiff's
rights. As Cooley observed, "Malicious motives make a bad act
worse, but they cannot make that a wrong which in its own essence
is lawful." 8 9 In Cooley's scheme, there was no consideration of an
individual defendant's motive. Such a particularized inquiry into a
"W KEETON, supra note 72, at 173-74.
" As one commentator put it, "the doctrine appears to punish only motives."
Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of
Malice, supra note 4, at 1104.
8' See Perdue v. J.C. Penney Co., 470 F Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying
Texas law); Bay City-Abraham Bros. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F Supp. 1206, 1211
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying Michigan law); Costell v. Toledo Hosp., 527 N.E.2d 858
(Ohio 1988); Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
88 See, e.g., Squire, supra note 4, at 657, 662; Note, The Prima Facie Tort
Doctrine, supra note 4, at 513 (Praising the prima facie tort doctrine as "helping to
develop the concept of 'no fault without liability."'); cf. Note, The Prima Facie Tort
Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of Malice, supra note 4, at
1113 n.67, 1126 (suggesting that requiring the malice as an element of the prima facie
tort reduces uncertainty about the boundaries of the tort).
19 T. COOLEY, ToRTs 690 (1st ed. 1879). Innumerable cases have cited Cooley's
statement. See, e.g., Hadley v. Southwest Properties, Inc., 570 P.2d 190, 193" (Ariz.
1977);- Krause v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 49 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Mich. 1951);
Teas, 460 S.W.2d at 242.
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single defendant's state of mind would have been inconsistent with
Cooley's highly formal scheme, m which conduct could be described
as wrongful m the abstract.90
Holmes, too, sought initially to base his tort theory on an ob-
jective measure of conduct. Holmes's fundamental thesis in his 1881
book, The Common Law, was that tort liability was based on public
policy, not individual moral blameworthiness. Thus, a particular
defendant's actual state of mind was not the measure of his conduct.
Rather, conduct was actionable if it fell below the standard demanded
of the average person on public policy grounds. Thus, both Cooley
and Holmes m their seminal efforts to systematize the law of torts
would have disregarded the defendant's motives.
Tort law m the late mneteenth century did include a few causes
of action that required proof of actual malice. 91 Despite the fact that
the two principal conceptualizations of tort law in that period both
would have demed any role for malice in establishing tort liability,
the presence of malice continued to be relevant to certain specific
causes of action.
In any event, sometime between 1881, when he published The
Common Law, and 1894, when he published "Privilege, Malice and
Intent," Holmes seems inexplicably to have changed his mind con-
cerning his objective standard. In his 1894 article, Holmes openly
acknowledged that, at least in the case of liability for conduct
inflicting intentional harm, the defendant's actual motives could be
relevant to determining the justification for, and thus the actionability
of, that conduct. 92 A decade later, m Aikens v Wisconsin, Holmes
observed that some justifications "may depend upon the end for
which the act is done." 9
Because Holmes's opimon in Aikens and his writing in "Privilege,
Malice and Intent" have so often been relied upon, Holmes's view
of justification m those documents has profoundly influenced the
development of the prima facie tort doctrine. Almost from its incep-
90 See Vandevelde, supra note 5.
9' 0. HOLMES, supra note 13, at 112-15; see also Holmes, supra note 15, at 4
("actual malice may make [one] liable when without it he would not have been").
Further, as Holmes later admitted, whether the defendant acted with malice also was
relevant in determining whether the defendant in certain cases would be permitted to
claim privilege as a defense. Id. at 9.
92 Holmes, supra note 18, at 5-6.
11 Aikens, 195 U.S. at 204.
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tion in the United States,94 prima facie tort doctrine was built on a
set of assumptions that contemplated an inquiry into the defendant's
actual state of mind. Holmes, the father of the objective standard
in negligence law, sired a general theory of intentional tort based on
a subjective standard of justification.
Holmes's change of mind was not shared by Cooley or those
who adhered to his formalistic, nghts-based conceptualization of
torts. Cooley's insistence that conduct was inherently lawful or un-
lawful and that its legality was not affected by the defendant's motive
remained an article of faith for some courts.9 Because of Holmes's
embrace of subjectivism in his later writings on intentional tort, it is
Cooley's theory of torts that has supplied the principal basis for the
resistance to a subjective theory of justification. Although Cooley's
formalism has been discredited and Is rights-based tort theory over-
shadowed by Holmes's tripartite scheme, Cooley's notion that malice
does not affect the lawfulness of conduct, divorced from its theoret-
ical underpinnings, remains for some courts a self-authenticating
proposition of law
Holmes's acknowledgement of the importance of motive in
"Privilege, Malice and Intent" seems mconsistent with his earlier
promotion of objective standards of liability m both negligent and
intentional torts.9 Holmes denied any contradiction, however. In
The Common Law, Holmes defined negligence as creating a foresee-
able risk of harm, while international torts were those in which the
defendant acted with a substantial certainty that harm would result.Y7
Holmes argued that foreseeability should be, and in fact was, meas-
ured by an objective standard.
In "Privilege, Malice and Intent" and Aikens, Holmes suggested
that justification (not foreseeability) was measured by a subjective
standard. In defending his subjective standard of justification, Holmes
explained in Aikens that
[it is no sufficient answer to this line of thought that motives are
not actionable, and that the standards of the law are external. That
94 One prima facie tort case, Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871), antedated
Holmes's published work on tort theory and thus was not influenced by that work.
Holmes's influence in subsequent prima facie tort cases, however, was quite substantial.
See Vandevelde, supra note 5.
91 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
96 See Kaplan, Encounters with Holmes, 96 -LRv L. REv 1828, 1833 (1983) (for
a concurring view).
97 See Vandevelde, supra note 5.
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is true m determining what a man is bound to foresee, but not
necessarily m determining the extent to which he can justify harm
which he has foreseen.9
Holmes never explained why different standards should be applied
to the elements of foreseeability and justification.
The Second Restatement's formulation of the prima facie tort
doctrine follows Holmes's own conception of the role of malice.
That is, malice is one factor to consider in determining the existence
of justification. Malice is neither necessary nor in all cases sufficient
for a finding that the defendant's conduct was not justified. Given
the inherent indeterminacy of balancing tests, in any event, it may
be'impossible to say in any given case that malice was the dispositive
factor. The contention that prima facie tort punishes malice thus
greatly exaggerates the role that malice actually plays in the Second
Restatement's formulation of that doctrine.
There is, of course, nothing about the prima facie tort doctrine
that necessitates the use. of a subjective standard to measure justifi-
cation. If an objective test of justification were used, then malice in
the sense of ill will would be irrelevant.99 Under an objective test of
justification, the prima facie tort doctrine would measure justification
solely by the social desirability of the defendant's conduct, without
regard to the defendant's subjective motives. Moreover, all of the
arguments made by Holmes on behalf of an objective standard in
The Common Law, arguments that have proved persuasive with
respect to negligence, suggest with equal force that an objective
standard should be applied to measure justification in the case of
prima facie tort. The influence of Holmes's later writing m "Privi-
lege, Malice and Intent" and Aikens, however, is such that no state
appears at present to have adopted an entirely objective test of
justification.
c. Causation
The third element, which requires that defendant's act cause
injury to the plaintiff, is rarely discussed by the case law or the
literature100 Causation analysis in prima facie tort does not appear
to differ from causation analysis m other torts.'0 '
Aikens, 195 U.S. at 204.
See supra text following note 77.
' The commentators generally discuss the doctnne as if it had only three ele-




The fourth element requires that the plaintiff have suffered in-
jury. Under the Second Restatement's formulation, there is no a
priori limitation on the type of harm that can be characterized as an
"injury" within the meaning of the prima facie tort doctrine. All
that generally is necessary is that the plaintiff prove some harm that
a court is willing to regard as legally cognizable.1 2 Clearly, however,
the decision whether to treat a particular harm as legally cognizable
is one of the most critical policy choices a court can make in deciding
whether to apply the doctrine of prima facie tort. 1m
The Restatement takes into account the nature and severity of
the harm in weighing the justification for the defendant's conduct.104
A trivial injury, for example, is more easily justified and thus rarely
a basis for recovery,105 while a severe injury or one well-established
as a basis for recovery places a heavier burden of justification on
the defendant. 06
2. The New York Formulation
The prima facie tort doctrine as formulated in New York requires
the plaintiff to establish the same four elements that are required by
the Second Restatement's formulation. As explained below, however,
New York arguably defines the scope of injuries potentially cogm-
ing causation in fact. See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 4, at 8; Squire, supra note 4, at
663-64; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial
Scrutiny of Malice, supra note 4, at 1103 (adding a fourth element: that the conduct be
otherwise lawful); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra note 4, at 503; Note,
Prima Facie Tort, supra note 4, at 122; Note, Abstaining From Willful Injury-The
Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra note 4, at 55.
lo, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment 1.
102 The plaintiff must prove injury to some legally protected interest, but it need
not be pecuniary in nature. Id. at comment m; see, e.g., Tully, 372 F Supp. at 1064
(prima facie tort permits recovery for invasion of interest in attending funeral of
immediate family members).
1o See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment e.
10 Id. at comment f. For example, one who is snubbed by another on the street
would be entitled to no recovery because this is an injury one "must bear as the price
of living in a society." Id. The triviality of the harm renders it easily justified by the
need for individual freedom in matters of social intercourse and by the importance of
reserving the courts for more serious disputes.
106 Id. Physical injury to persons and property traditionally have weighed heavily,
while injury to advantageous relations has weighed less heavily, particularly where those
relations are prospective. Emotional injury has been given varying degrees of weight,
depending upon its severity.
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zable under the prima facie tort doctrine somewhat more narrowly
than the Second Restatement and requires the plaintiff to prove as
additional elements that the defendant's conduct was not otherwise
tortious and that the defendant was motivated solely by malice. Ths
section assesses these additional elements of the New York formu-
lation.
a. The Requirement that the Conduct Not be Actionable Under
Another Tort Theory
The courts of New York"'7 and of at least three other states10
have limited prima facie tort to conduct that is not actionable under
another tort theory, as if to say that prima facie tort should be a
kind of "tort of last resort." This limitation at times has been
expressed as a requirement that the conduct be "otherwise lawful."i 109
These two versions of the limitation generally are treated as substan-
tively identical.110
The inclusion of this element is to some extent an historical
accident."' The earliest prima facie tort cases in New York involved
'07 See, e.g., Horowitz v. Sprague, 440 F Supp. 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (action for
malicious prosecution could not be brought as prima facie tort); Harris Diamond Co.
v. Army Times Pub. Co., 280 F Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (action for inducing breach
of contract could not be brought as prima facie tort); Long v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 330
N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress could not be brought as prima facie tort); Nationwide Carpets v. Lennett Pub.,
298 N.Y.S.2d 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (action for libel could not be brought as prima
facie tort); Lake Minnewaska Mountain Houses, Inc. v. Smiley, 297 N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969) (action for slander of business could not be brought as prima facie tort);
Ruza v. Ruza, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955) ("If plaintiff only intends
to rely on the prima facie tort theory in this case, he should confine his pleadings to
allegations of fact and averments of special damage limited to this tort and eliminate
any statement of wrongdoing and injury appropriate to one or more of the traditional
torts."); Brandt v. Winchell, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954).
'' See Kaye, 395 A.2d at 369 (Delaware-dicta); Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 265 (Mis-
souri); Schmitz, 785 P.2d at 736 (New Mexico).
'19 See A.T.I., Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232, 398 N.Y.S.2d
864, 866 (N.Y. 1977); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978);
Sommer v. Kaufman, 399 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Ruza, 146 N.Y.S.2d at
811 ("The key to the prima facie tort is the infliction of intentional harm, resulting in
damage, without excuse or justification, by an act or a series of acts which would
otherwise be lawful.").
110 In Ruza, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 810, a leading case articulating both versions, the two
appear to be used interchangeably. As suggested by notes 101 and 103, both versions
appear frequently in the New York case law with no indication that they have different
meanings.
' See Burns v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. 1983) (suggesting
a similar theory of the origin of this element).
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conduct not actionable under another tort, a circumstance that sug-
gested the need for a new theory of liability. In Beardsley v Kilmer,"2
for example, the first New York prima facie tort case, the plaintiff
conceded that the defendant's conduct m starting a rival newspaper
that drew away plaintiff's employees, advertisers, and subscribers
was "inherently lawful." ' The court phrased the issue as follows:
under what circumstances would "an inherently lawful act . . be
held actionable because of the impulses which lead to its perform-
ance" 11 4 The prima facie tort doctrine was adopted to provide a
basis for recovery for conduct not actionable under another theory
Similarly, m the second New York prima facie tort case, Al
Rashid v News Syndicate Co., 5 the plaintiff sued the defendant for
malicious prosecution based on the defendant's having given false
information about the plaintiff to the immigration authorities, re-
sulting in the plaintiff's arrest and deportation. The court held that
the defendant's conduct was not actionable as malicious prosecution
because the deportation proceeding was not a judicial one, and the
defendant's conduct did not constitute mstigation of an action.11 6
The court then held, however, that "[e]ven a lawful act done solely
out of malice and ill will to injure another may be actionable. 117
Again, the prima facie tort doctrine was proposed in a setting in
which the defendant's conduct was not actionable under another tort
theory.
Nothing in these early decisions, however, indicated that the
absence of another theory of liability would be a necessary condition
for application of the prima facie tort doctrine in future cases.
Indeed, in the very next two New York prima facie tort cases, both
involving peaceful labor action for an allegedly unlawful purpose,
the court did not address at all whether the defendant's conduct was
otherwise lawful."'
In the mid 1950's, however, the New York courts suddenly began
to treat the doctrine as if the particular circumstances of its initial
.12 140 N.E. 203 (N.Y. 1923).
"3 Beardsley v. Kilmer, 140 N.E. 203, 204 (N.Y 1923). Arguably, the defendant's
conduct constituted an interference with contractual relations, which was a recognized
tort in New York at that time. See Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 125 N.E. 817 (N.Y.
1920). Plaintiff apparently did not plead that tort, however.
"4 Beardsley, 140 N.E. at 204.
"' 191 N.E. 713 (N.Y. 1934).
226 Rashid v. News Syndicate Co., 191 N.E. 713 (N.Y 1934).
" Id. at 714.
,' Opera on Tour v. Weber, 34 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y 1941); American Guild of Musical
Artists v. Petrillo, 36 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 1941).
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creation, the absence of another theory of liability applicable to the
defendant's conduct, were in fact a condition of the doctrine's future
application. In treating fis element as if it always had been part of
the doctrine, these early cases simply stated the element as an estab-
lished fact, making no attempt to explain or justify its inclusion. 119
Courts and commentators m later years have attempted to artic-
ulate a rationale for this rule. As will be seen, however, none of the
proposed rationales is particularly convincing.
One rationale is that otherwise unlawful acts will be compensated
under another tort theory, unless the policy underlying the other tort
excludes such acts, in which case they should not be compensable
under the prima facie tort doctrine either. 120 Yet, the law permits
particular conduct to be actionable under more than one theory in
other contexts,12' and there is no apparent reason to insist that prima
facie tort be purely interstitial.
A second rationale for the rule is to avoid an undue expansion
of litigation.12 If this is the rationale, then the rule seems especially
il-considered. Because the rule precludes finding a prima facie tort
only where some other tort already applies, it merely prevents the
prima facie tort doctrine from being duplicative of other tort theories.
It does not prevent prima facie tort from expanding liability to cover
any previously nonactionable conduct.
A third possible rationale for the rule, and one which overlaps
the first two, is that the courts wish not to revisit, under the rubric
of prima facie tort, policy decisions made in the context of another
tort. Yet, as noted above,'2 the Restatement view is that policy
judgments made in adjudicating another tort generally will not be
disturbed when the same conduct is adjudicated under the prina
facie tort theory 124 The New York rule thus is largely unnecessary
Insofar as the rule were interpreted to require that the defendant's
conduct be otherwise lawful in all respects, it would be irrational as
I See Ruza, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 810; Brandt, 148 N.E.2d at 163.
110 Burns, 451 N.E.2d at 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 712; Note, Prima Facie Tort Rec-
ognized in Missouri, supra note 4, at 556.
121 See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (holding that a claim
for malpractice could be brought against an attorney as either a tort or contract action).
2 Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 270 (suggesting that this is the purpose of the rule); see
also Sheppard v. Coopers', Inc., 156 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd,
157 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
I" See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
124 For example, prima facie tort would not lie for malicious prosecution of a
pending action because the traditional tort of malicious prosecution could not be brought
in that situation. See, e.g., Knapp Engraving Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 635; Friedman, 74
N.Y.S.2d 733 (1947). See also Brown, supra note 4, at 571.
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well. It makes no sense whatever to immunize conduct from tort
liability because it is criminal or otherwise unlawful. 125
In any event, courts have taken steps toward moderating the
effect of the requirement. Recent decisions in the jurisdictions adopt-
Ing tis requirement allow the plaintiff to allege that the conduct
constituting prima facie tort also is actionable under other tort
theories, although the plaintiff apparently will not be allowed to
recover under the prima facie tort theory if the facts prove another
tort cause of action. 26 Recent case law in New York also indicates
some willingness to reexamine this requirement entirely 27
b. The Requirement of Malice
The New York courts also hold that prima facie tort will lie only
if the defendant was motivated solely by malice.' 2 New York deci-
sions occasionally have defined malice as "a wrongful act done
intentionally without just cause or excuse, ' ' 29 a definition also fol-
2I Burns, 451 N.E.2d at 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 712; see also Brown, supra note 4,
at 569.
The absurdity of this interpretation of the otherwise lawful requirement is illustrated
by Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965),
in which the court refused to apply the prima facie tort doctrine to the defendants'
conduct of operating a rigged television quiz program because the conduct was dishonest,
i.e., not otherwise lawful. Ai the same time, the defendant's conduct did not fit within
any other tort. Insofar as the doctrine of prima facie tort was concerned, the defendants'
very wrongfulness shielded them from liability.
Similarly, in Greco, 747 S.W.2d at 730, the defendants' conduct of harassing thfe
plaintiffs in order to coerce them to sign a release was not actionable as a prima facie
tort because the court did not consider harassment and coercion to be lawful acts. Again,
the defendants were shielded from liability for a prima facie tort by the very wrongfulness
of their conduct.
126 See Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 343 N.E.2d 278,
285, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 645 (N.Y. 1975) ("once a traditional tort has been established
the allegation with respect to prima facie tort will be rendered academic"); Bandag of
Sprngfield, Inc., 662 S.W.2d at 552 ("Alternative pleading of a prima facie tort cause
of action is not objectionable, [citation omitted], but if at the close of all the evidence,
the plaintiff's proof justifies submission of his cause as a recognized tort, the prima
facie tort claim may not be submitted."); accord Schmitz, 785 P.2d at 726.
127 Burns, 451 N.E.2d at 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
I's See Durham Indus. v. North River Ins. Co., 673 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1982);
Reinforce, Inc..v. Birney, 124 N.E.2d 104 (N.Y 1959); Beardsley, 140 N.E. at 205-206;
Gold v. East Ramapo Cent. School Dist., 496 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
Squire Records, Inc. v. Vanguard Recording Soc'y, 268 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253-54 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1966).
29 American Guild of Musical Artists, 36 N.E.2d at 125; Colwell, 62 N.E. at 670
(N.Y. 1902).
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lowed from time to time by other courts. 10 Where that definition is
used, the requirement of malice adds nothing to the other elements
of the tort, and the use of the term serves merely to confuse.
31
The far more common definition of malice in this context is that
proposed by Holmes, "disinterested malevolence. 132 Disinterested
malevolence exists where the defendant has no motive for ins conduct
other than injuring the plaintiff.13
Whatever the merits of a subjective standard in general, the New
York rule requiring that the defendant's conduct be motivated solely
by malice seems particularly unsound, as an initial matter, because
of the enormous difficulty in demonstrating that any defendant acted
with but a single motive 34 If the jury finds that the defendant was
in any way motivated by self-gain or altruism, then the plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie tort.
The requirement of disinterested malevolence originated with
Beardsley v. Kilmer, the first New York prima facie tort case.1
35
After citing Holmes's use of the phrase, the court explained that the
phrase meant that "the genesis which will make a lawful act unlawful
must be a malicious one unmixed with any other and exclusively
directed to injury and damage of another.' 1 6 Beardsley's disinter-
ested malevolence requirement reappeared twenty-three years later in
Ledwith v International Paper Co. 3 7 and has become a well-estab-
lished element of New York's prima facie tort doctrine.'
,30 See Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746, 748 n.1 (5th Cir. 1973); Smith
v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 349 F.2d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 1965).
"' Trautwein, 123 A.2d at 38.
,32 See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358
(1920); Aikens, 195 U.S. at 206.
" American Bank & Trust Co., 256 U.S. at 358; Aikens, 195 U.S. at 206.
,34 See United States v. Vest, 639 F Supp. 899, 904 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 813
F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1988), in which the court observed that "[i]t is characteristic of
human experience that individuals usually-perhaps even always-act with mixed mo-
tives." The court went on to refer to the "virtually insurmountable difficulty demon-
strating the absence of any legitimate purpose as at least in some degree a part of the
actor's motivation. " and to assert that requiring such a demonstration "would
encourage disingenuous testimony and post hoc justifications." Id.
,"5 See supra notes 25-27, 112-14 and accompanying text.
36 Beardsley, 140 N.E. at 206.
,37 64 N.Y.S.2d 810, 813 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 66 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y App.
Div. 1946). The requirement that the defendant's conduct be motivated solely by malice
was reiterated in at least one of the prima facie tort cases decided between 1923 and
1946, but without using Holmes's phrase. See Al Raschid, 191 N.E. at 713. Other cases
did not mention the requirement at all. See, e.g., American Guild of Musical Artists,
36 N.E.2d at 123; Opera on Tour, 34 N.E.2d at 349. Thus, it was possible for an early
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The requirement of disinterested malevolence as a practical matter
operates.as the functional equivalent of an incredibly broad, subjec-
tive definition of justification, under which injurious conduct is
nonactionable whenever the defendant has any self-interested or al-
truistic motive at all. As has been noted, 139 Holmes had proposed a
definition of justification that was subjective at least in part. Holmes
also had applied m his opinions a broad view of justification. 140
Clearly, however, Holmes regarded the existence of justification
as a policy decision to be made on the facts of each case, with the
defendant's motives considered as but one factor in that decision.1 41
Holmes, m other words, did not propose that disinterested malevo-
lence be a necessary element of prima facie tort. In adopting his
definition of malice as a condition of liability in prima facie tort,
the New York courts gave it an importance Holmes never contem-
plated. 42
It has been argued that requiring disinterested malevolence essen-
tially defeats the purpose of the prima facie tort doctrine.1 43 In fact,
however, the requirement is consistent with the theory of the doc-
trine, which does not presuppose any particular view of what con-
stitutes justification. Requiring malice simply reflects a judicial policy
of enormous deference to those who act out of self-interest, even at
a great cost to others.
Malice, in any event, is only a necessary and not a sufficient
basis for liability in New York. Even where malice is shown, the
defendant may not be liable if his conduct was justified by public
policy considerations.144
commentator to conclude that the presence of malice, although relevant, was not re-
quired. See Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra note 4, at 510.
"I See, e.g., supra note 128.
,19 See supra notes 19, 92-98 and accompanying text.
110 In Plant, 57 N.E. at 1015-16, and Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. -, 1079-
82 (Mass. 1896), for example, Holmes believed that the defendants' conduct was justified
while the majority held for the plaintiff.
14, See Vandevelde, supra note 5.
142 The phrase "disinterested malevolence" appears to have been coined by Holmes
in his discussion of malice in Aikens, 195 U.S. at 200. In Aikens, the court was reviewing
the validity of a Wisconsin statute that prohibited two or more persons to combine with
malice for the purpose of injuring another in his trade or business. Holmes analogized
the statute to the prima facie tort doctrine, with the presence of malice playing the same
role in the statutory cause of action as the absence of justification did in prima facie
tort. The central importance of malice in Aikens thus was somewhat fortuitous, and
arose from the fact that the statute used that concept.
141 See Schmitz, 785 P.2d at 735.
I" See, e.g., ATI, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 1230, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864 (defendants who
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The observation that the New York prima facie tort doctrine
punishes malice thus seems nusplaced. In New York, the malice
requirement actually serves to reduce the scope of liability under the
prima facie tort doctrine because the defendant's lack of malice
permits her to escape liability in cases in which other states would
have imposed it.
Further, because even malicious conduct is not actionable if
justified, malicious conduct is not ipso facto actionable. The most
that can be said is that the New York cases punish some conduct
that is motivated solely by malice, a far cry from the claim that
prima facie tort renders malice actionable.
c. The Requirement of Special Damages
New York law generally requires that the plaintiff prove "special
damages,"' 145 a term that has been interpreted to mean some form
of pecuniary loss.'4 The term seems to be derived from Holmes's
definition of prima facie tort in Aikens and "Privilege, Malice and
Intent" as requiring "temporal damage,"' 147 a term Holmes never
def'med.'41
The only apparent rationale for the special damages requirement
is that it serves to limit potential liability. 49 Yet, courts have been
willing to authorize recovery for intentional invasion of nonpecuniary
interests under other more specific torts, such as assault, invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 5° Thus, New
maliciously spread negative information concermng plaintiff's product were not liable
because the commumcations were justified by the public interest in having the infor-
mation made available); Brandt, 148 N.E.2d at 163, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (court will
disregard malicious motive if action was justified by the public welfare); Burns, 437
N.Y.S.2d at 903 (even assuming that mass transit strike was motivated solely by malice,
injured plaintiffs would have no cause of action for prima facie tort if the public gain
from the strike outweighed the harm).
14, See Knapp Engraving Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d at 638; Brandt, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 867-
68.
' See Hoppenstem v. Zemek, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Note,
Prima Facie Tort, supra note 4, at 124.
"47 See supra notes 19, 23, and accompanying text.
'," Early New York pnma facie tort decisions adopted the definition of prima facie
tort set forth in Aikens. See, e.g., Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 70
N.E.2d 401, 403 (N.Y. 1946); Frawley Chem. Corp. v. A.P Larson Co., 86 N.Y.S.2d
710, 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949). Some New York pnma facie tort cases even used
Holmes's "temporal damage" interchangeably with "special damages." See, e.g., Lake
Minnewaski MountainHouse, Inc., 297 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
1' Sheppard, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
11o See W KEETON, supra note 72, at 43, 54-60, 849-51.
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York's attempt to limit prima facie tort to cases involving pecuniary
loss seems arbitrary and, not surprisingly, has been criticized as
analytically unsound.151
In any event, New York case law gives some indication that the
pecuniary loss requirement is not as rigorous as it first appears.
Notwithstanding the requirement, the New York courts have permit-
ted recovery under the prima facie tort doctrine for injuries as diverse
as creating discontent among employees, 52 damaging one's reputation
for marital fidelity, 53 and causing investigations by federal agen-
cies.y4 In other words, "special damages" in some cases have not
been limited to pecuniary loss. Thus, it may well be that all the
special damages requirement demands is that the plaintiff prove a
"reasonably identifiable loss[ $)155
d. The Common Theme: Containing Liability
It is tempting to regard each of the three additional limitations
imposed by New York on the prima facie tort doctrine as mere
accidents of history which, at their inception, were neither required
by applicable precedent nor based on any articulated public policy.
The requirement that conduct not be otherwise actionable arose from
the coincidence that the early prima facie tort cases happened to
involve such conduct. 56 The requirement of malice ostensibly is
attributable to a misunderstanding of Holmes's own writing on the
prima facie tort doctrne. 1' The requirement of "special damages"
is derived from Holmes's unexplained phrase "temporal damage."'15
Yet, however accidental each of the requirements seems in iso-
lation, collectively they may be seen as simply a reflection of concern
by the New York courts that the prima facie tort doctrine not lead
I' Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 271; Brown, supra note 4, at 571; see also Morrison, 266
N.Y.S.2d at 416 (court observed that discouraging new causes of action was a "bad"
reason to require proof of special damages).
152 A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475, 481 (N.Y.
1957).
"I Schauder v. Weiss, 88 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 94 N.Y.S.2d
748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
"4 Gale v. Ryan, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941); Al Raschtd, 191 N.E.
at 713.
" Bohm v. Holzberg, 365 N.Y.S.2d 262, 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Skouras v.
Brut Prod., Inc., 360 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Burns, 437 N.Y.S.2d
at 904; Best Window Co. v. Better Business Bureau, 146 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (N.Y. 1955).
"' See supra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
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to an expansion of litigation or liability 159 Indeed, if there has been
a single, persistent objection to the prima facie tort doctrine, it is
that it could encourage litigation16 and expand potential liability 161
The concern that prima facie tort will lead to increased litigation
seems unjustified m light of the empirical evidence. In New York,
for example, during the two year period ending May 31, 1990, there
were only 35 reported decisions in which recovery was sought under
the prima fade tort doctrine.'1 Without exception, in every case in
"19 Brown, supra note 4, at 571; Forkosch, supra note 4, at 479; Note, The Prima
Facie Tort Doctrine in Missouri: Commission of a Lawful Act with Intent to Injure
May Result in Liability, supra note 4, at 131.
11 See, e.g., Catron v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Mo. 1987) (en
banc) (noting efforts by Missouri courts to limit the application of the doctrine and the
concern that the tort would be too widely applied); Brown, supra note 4, at 565; Note,
Prima Facie Tort, supra note 4, at 129; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in Missouri:
Commission of a Lawful Act with Intent to Injure May Result in Liability, supra note
4, at 136.
-61 See, e.g., Lundberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 661 S.W.2d 667, 670
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (expressing concern that prima facie tort could degenerate into a
"disastrous" doctrine of liability with no "defined beginning, course, or end"); Beardsley,
140 N.E. at 206 (suggesting that it would be "unsafe" to fashion a broad doctrine of
prima facie tort).
2 See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (N.Y.
1989); Jemison v. Crichlow, 543 N.E.2d 78, 544 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. 1989); Midtown
Candy Co., Inc. v. Helmsley Spear, 554 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Amodei
v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 553 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Sutton
v. Lavezzo, 553 N.Y.S.2d 386 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Giannelli v. St. Vincent's Hosp.,
553 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Kaplan v. Dart Towing, Inc., 552 N.Y.S.2d
665 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); James v. Hoffman, 551 N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990); Lewis v. Stiles, 551 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Ramsay v. Mary
Imogene Bassett Hosp., 551 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Omnivest Inc. v.
Elders Futures Inc., 550 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Yohay v. Matin, 549
N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Smukler v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 548 N.Y.S.2d
437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); 40 Eastco v. Fischman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 614 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989); Rad Advertising, Inc. v. United Footwear Org., Inc., 546 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989); Sullivan v. Board of Educ., 546 N.Y.S.2d 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989);
Gouldsbury v. Dan's Supreme Supermkt., Inc., 546 N.Y.S.2d 379 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989); Schlotthauer v. Sanders, 545 N.Y.S.2d 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Vrontas v.
Bonsa Seggerman & Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Alexander &
Alexander of N.Y., Inc. v. Fritzen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Mendez
v. Apple Bank for Say., 541 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Anderson Properties,
Inc. v. Sawhill Tubular Div., Cyclops Corp., 540 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989);
D'Avno v. Trachtenburg, 539 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Horowitz v. Aetna
Life Ins., 539 N.Y.S.2d 50 (NY. App. Div. 1989); Forrich Tennis Corp. v. Levin, 538
N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Impastato v. Hellman Enters., Inc., 537 N.Y.S.2d
659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Summers v. County of Monroe, 537 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989); Schlotthauer v. Sanders, 531 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
Jemison v. Crichlow, 531 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 544 N.Y.S.2d
813 (N.Y. 1989); Weaver v. Putnam Hosp. Center, 530 N.Y.S.2d 998 (N.Y. App. Div.
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which a party alleged prima facie tort, that party also relied on at
least one other cause of action. Presumably, all of these cases would
have been brought even without prima facie tort as a cause of action.
The inference is that adoption of the prima facie tort did not in any
discernible way increase the number of actions filed, but merely
added an additional theory of recovery.
Nor is prima facie tort frequently used by the New York courts
to expand liability Of the 35 cases reviewed, the prima facie tort
claim was unsuccessful in every one. Although the prima facie tort
doctrine has been a part of the New York law for nearly seventy
years, it is not a powerful force for expanding liability.
These figures, of course, could be taken as evidence of the
effectiveness of New York's restrictions on the prima facie tort
doctrine. Yet, the evidence from Missouri, the only other state with
more than a handful of reported prina facie tort decisions, suggests
that the same result could and would occur even without New York's
limitations.
Missouri has adopted the Restatement formulation,16 with one
modification: Missouri borrowed from New York the requirement
that conduct not be otherwise actionable.164 As noted above,16 how-
ever, that element has no capacity to limit liability since it does not
prevent the prima facie tort doctrine from imposing liability for
conduct not previously actionable, but only from using the prima
facie tort doctrine as an additional basis of liability for conduct
already actionable. Thus, for purposes of assessing the impact of
prima facie tort on expanding liability, Missouri could be regarded
as having adopted the equivalent of the Restatement version. Despite
Missouri's rejection of New York's liability limiting elements, how-
ever, "no case resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff on a prima facie
tort theory has been affirmed by the Missouri appellate courts."' 166
1988); Monsanto v. Electric Data Sys. Corp., 529 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
Yerg v. Board of Educ., 529 N.Y.S.2d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
In three of the cases prima facie tort was alleged as a counterclaim, but never as
the sole counterclaim. See Schulz v. Washington County, 550 N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990); Sasso v. Cormola, 545 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); IBM Credit
Fin. Corp. v. Mazda Motor Mfg. (USA) Corp., 542 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
163 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 870.
'" Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 265.
"' See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
' Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bure, 758 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988);
see also Brown v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 720 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Mo. 1986) (en banc),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987). The quoted statement is techmcally incorrect. The
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III. THE FuTuRE oF THE PRIMA FAcE TORT DocTRiNE
A. The Rationale for a General Theory of Intentional Tort
1. Pollock's Argument for Doctrinal Symmetry
In their writings on prima facie tort, Pollock and Holmes each
argued for judicial adoption of the doctrine, although on somewhat
different grounds. For Pollock, adoption of the doctrine was de-
manded by the internal logic of tort law. After noting that the law
of negligence imposed a universal duty on all persons to avoid causing
harm to others, he argued that "[i]f there exists, then, a positive
duty to avoid harm, much more must there exist the negative duty
of not doing wilful harm; subject, as all general duties must be
subject, to the necessary exceptions." 16 This argument, wich may
be called the argument from symmetry, asserts that the structure of
tort doctrine has an inexplicable gap m the absence of a general
theory of intentional tort.
Much of the support for the prima facie tort doctrine rests on
this perception, originating with Pollock, that the doctrine fills a gap
m the body of tort law, providing theoretical symmetry between
intentional and negligent tort while authorizing recovery in those
situations in which liability ought to be unposed even though the
defendant's conduct does not fit within any other tort.'6 The argu-
ment from symmetry, however, is weak on several grounds.
First, any insistence that the law be symmetrical is but gratuitous
conceptualism. In a common law system in which courts declare the
law in discrete episodes of narrow dispute resolution, it simply is a
vain quest to strive for a day when the rules of tort law will rest m
a symmetric harmony. However strong and even useful the impulse
to categorize existing rules of law under propositions of ascending
generality, scholars who would create new rules merely to fill gaps
discovered in the process of categorization forget the wisdom of a
very first prima facie tort case in Missouri, Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 265, affirmed a
verdict for the plaintiff on a prima facie tort theory.
11 F PoLocK, supra note 16, at 23.
168 Brown, supra note 4, at 565; Halpern, supra note 4, at 17; Squire, supra note
4, at 662; Note, Prima Facie Tort, supra note 4, at 128; Note, Abstaining From Willful
Injury-The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra note 4, at 53; Note, The Prima Facie
Tort Doctrine in Missouri: Commission of a Lawful Act with Intent to Injury May
Result in Liability, supra note 4, at 136.
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judicial system which defers rule making until it is required by a
genuine dispute set m concrete factual circumstances.19
Second, the argument from symmetry misperceives the nature of
negligence law as well as the relationship between negligent and
intentional tort. Negligence itself has never truly rested on a general
theory Whatever the generality in its formulation, negligence initially
imposed liability principally for physical harms. 170 Only gradually and
with qualifications have the courts applied the theory to impose
liability for nonphysical harms, such as emotional distress,' 7' or loss
of an expectancy.' 72
Intentional tort, on the other hand, while perceived since the
time of Holmes as a collection of discrete causes of action,17 actually
has, protected a wider variety of interests against harm than negli-
gence. For example, intentional tort, far more readily than negligent
tort, has imposed duties not to inflict emotional distress, cause the
loss of an expectancy, or injure another through vexatious litiga-
tion. 74 Indeed, in many respects, intentional tort rests at the outer
boundary of tort law, defining the line between duty and no duty,
so that newly recognized interests are protected against intentional
interference before they are protected against other forms of invasion.
Thus, even assuming that it were a desirable goal, symmetry between
intentional and negligent tort does not require a general theory of
intentional tort.
2. Holmes's Methodological Argument
Holmes's support for a general theory of intentional tort rested
on methodological rather than doctrinal grounds. In his 1894 article
169 For a recounting and criticism of neoconceptualist impulses in modern tort law,
see G. WRiTE, TORT LAw iN AimEiCA 211-43 (1985).
110 W KEETON, supra note 72, at 359.
"7 Id. at 359-66.
172 Id. at 1008.
'7 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
,74 For a discussion of tort protection of the interest in emotional well being, see
W KEETON, supra note 72, at 54-66, 361-62.
For a discussion of tort, protection of contractual expectations or prospective
advantage, see W KEETON, supra note 72, at 978-89, 997-1002, 1005-09; Rabin, Tort
Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss; A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REv
1513 (1985); Note, Negligent Interference with Contract: Knowledge as a Standard for
Recovery, 63 VA. L. REv 813 (1977).
For a discussion of tort protection against vexatious litigation, see Stephens v. State
Dept. of Revenue, 746 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1987); Smith v. Griffiths, 476 A.2d 22 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984).
[Vol.. 79
PRnIA FACto TORT DocTmn
"Privilege, Malice and Intent,"' 75 Holmes treated the doctrine as a
framework for determining whether to impose liability for the inten-
tional infliction of injury.176
That is, the doctrine of prima facie tort describes the analysis by
which courts consider whether legal protection against intentional
interference should be extended to a particular interest or, in other
words, whether a new duty not to cause injury should be imposed.i7
That framework can be used equally well to reassess a prior decision
that imposed a duty to avoid a particular type of intentional harm.
The prima facie tort doctrine formulates the assessment of lia-
bility for intentional harm as a three-step process. First, the court
must determine whether the interest ivaded is legally cogmzable; has
the plaintiff suffered "injury"? This overt policy decision may in-
volve an abundance of considerations, such as the severity of injury,
the ease or difficulty with which it is inflicted, and problems of
proof. Minor injuries easily inflicted in the hurly-burly of daily
activity, for example, generally would not be legally cognizable.17 1
The decision that an interest shall be legally cognizable in effect
creates a new area of tort liability, adjusting the boundary between
duty and no duty 179 Thus, the decision to protect an interest in many
respects is the most critical policy choice facing the court.
The second step is to determine whether intentional invasions of
that interest are justified under the circumstances of the case. This
decision is somewhat less critical, since it implicates only future cases
involving invasion of the same interest under similar circumstances.
A broad view of justification can narrow considerably the scope of
liability created by the recognition of a new legally cognizable injury.
Again, the decision whether the defendant's conduct is justified is
an overt policy choice, based on a weighing of the benefits and
harms attributable to the defendant's conduct in this case. If the
defendant's conduct was justified, she would not be liable no matter
how grievous the injury
"I' Holmes, supra note 16, at I.
176 In his judicial opimons as well, Holmes treated the prima facie tort doctrine
more as an analytical scheme than a specific tort. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E.
1011, 1016 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I" See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 566, 573; Note, Prima Facie Tort, supra note
4, at 122; Halpern, supra note 4, at 11.
173 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment f (1979).
,"I Once a new form of injury, such as emotional distress, has been recognized in
the context of intentional tort, it can be expected that plaintiffs will seek to recover




If the defendant's conduct was not justified, the prima facie tort
doctrine declares her liable for intentional invasions of the plaintiff's
interest. The final step is simply to determine whether this particular
defendant intended and caused the plaintiffs injury. 18°
B. The Relationship Between the Prima Facie Tort Doctrine and
Other Torts
The relationship between the prima facie tort doctrine and other
torts is defined by the manner in which courts resolve two issues,
both of wich arise because of the generality with which the prima
facie tort doctrine is formulated. The first issue is whether the prima
facie tort doctrine subsumes other intentional torts, that is, whether
it is "the" intentional tort.' Holmes seems to have answered this
question affirmatively Thus, he would have used the doctrine as the
basis for assessing liability for all intentional harms, whether or not
actionable under other torts.'8
No jurisdiction, however, appears to have adopted Holmes's view
on this issue.' In jurisdictions following the Restatement formula-
tion, prima facie tort appears to constitute merely an additional
theory of liability, which applies to the same conduct as other
intentional torts without displacing or subsuming them as theories of
liability 184 In jurisdictions following the New York formulation, the
prima facie tort doctrne simply does not apply to conduct actionable
under another tort.'85
How this first issue is resolved has obvious practical implications.
To the extent that prima facie tort subsumes all other intentional
torts, it unifies the theoretical basis for intentional tort, thus simpli-
fying analysis. Further, as explained below, a prima facie tort doc-
trine that subsumes other intentional torts provides a court with the
opportunity not only to expand, but also to limit or even roll back,
the scope of liability under intentional tort. Holmes, for example,
110 If not, the court may undertake a further inquiry to determine whether the
legally cognizable interest should be protected against negligent injury as well. If so, the
defendant may be liable for negligence even if she is not liable for an intentional tort.
I Note, Abstaining From Willful Injury: The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra
note 4, at 68.
182 See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
"I Brown, supra note 4, at 571; Note, Prima Facie Tort, supra note 4, at 130;
Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in Missouri: Commission of a Lawful Act with
Intent to Injure May Result in Liability, supra note 4, at 136.
,14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment j.
"I See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
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would have used prima facie tort to limit judicial restrictions on
peaceful labor action, immunizing action that was otherwise enjoin-
able under existing legal doctnnes. 116
A decision that the prima facie tort doctrine subsumes other torts
would not necessarily lead to a different result in any particular case
than would be reached were that doctrine considered simply an
additional cause of action. In theory, the only consequence that
necessarily would result from that decision would be the unification
of the theoretical bases of intentional tort. Whether the results of
particular cases would be different would depend upon how the
courts resolved the second issue concerning the relationship between
the prima facie tort doctrine and other intentional torts.
The second issue is whether courts, in applying the prima facie
tort doctrine, will defer to policy determinations made by courts in
adjudicating conduct actionable under other intentional torts. To the
extent that courts felt entirely bound by such determinations, the
result in a particular case would be identical whether the plaintiff
proceeded under a theory of prima facie tort or another tort. On
the other hand, to the extent that courts felt relatively unrestrained
by prior determinations made in the context of other torts, the prima
facie tort doctrine would permit different results to be reached de-
pending upon whether the plaintiff alleged prima facie tort or another
tort.187
Where courts feel unrestrained by prior determinations under
other torts, two different scenarios can be imagined. The first sce-
nario occurs where the prima facie tort subsumes other intentional
torts. In that scenario, the doctrine has the potential to expand, limit,
or even reduce the scope of liability for intentional harms. For
example, a court might decide that the policy of discouraging vexa-
tious litigation had been given insufficient weight in past decisions
and that an action for prima facie tort would lie for suits filed
maliciously and without probable cause, even in certain cases where
the prior action had not yet terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Such
a determination would expand liability beyond that presently imposed
by the tort of malicious prosecution.'1 Alternatively, a court might
'" See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Plant, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"7 Obviously, this fact alone suggests no criticism of the prima facie tort doctrine.
Every lawyer is familiar with the fact that particular conduct may lead to liability under
one cause of action and not another.
Us The general rule is that an action for malicious prosecution of a civil action will
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decide that the policy of discouraging vexatious litigation had been
given too much weight in past decisions and that an action would
lie for suits filed maliciously and without probable cause only where
there was also proof of actual malice beyond that which can be
inferred from the want of probable cause. This decision would reduce
liability relative to that presently imposed by the tort of malicious
prosecution.'19 Since, in this first scenario, prima facie tort subsumes
malicious prosecution, the effect of reducing liability under the prima
facie tort doctrine would be to reduce the scope of liability under
malicious prosecution as well.
The second scenario occurs where the prima facie tort doctrine
does not subsume other torts, but (as in the first) the courts never-
theless feel unrestrained by prior determinations. In this second
scenario, the doctrine, if it has any impact at all, will tend to expand
liability, even if only marginally This is because, even assuming the
courts use their discretion to resolve policy questions against imposing
liability in situations where the defendant would have been liable
under another tort, the defendant would remain liable under that
other tort. Depending upon how courts resolve particular cases, the
prima facie tort doctrine ultimately could become largely irrelevant,
because it could recognize only those interests already protected by
other intentional torts, or it could expand liability by recognizing
interests not protected by other intentional torts. In tlus scenario,
however, the prima facie tort would have little power to limit or
reduce liability 190
Both formulations of the modem prima facie tort doctrine ad-
dress this second issue concerning the relationship between the prima
facie tort doctrine and other torts. The New York formulation defers
almost completely to policy determinations made in the context of
other torts. It expresses this deference through the rule that the prima
facie tort doctrine applies only to conduct that is not actionable
under another tort. 91 This largely insulates prior policy determia-
lie only where the defendant filed a prior action against the plaintiff with malice and
without probable cause, and the prior action has terminated in favor of the plaintiff.
W KEETON, supra note 72, at 892.
"9 The general rule is that malice may be inferred from the lack of probable cause.
Id. at 895.
190 Conceivably, a well-reasoned prima facie tort decision declining to impose lia-
bility for conduct actionable under another tort theory could lead a court to reexamine
the other theory. Thus, the prima facie tort could have an occasional tendency toward
restricting liability.
" See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
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tions made in the context of other torts from the potentially desta-
bilizing influence of the prima facie tort doctrine.
The Restatement formulation implicitly allows the prima facie
tort doctrine to be an alternative basis for recovery for conduct
actionable under another tort. 1' 2 The Restatement formulation, more-
over, defers in most but not all cases to prior policy determinations. 193
It does permit the prima facie tort doctrine to impose liability for
conduct that would have been privileged under another tort theory.
In other words, the Restatement formulation allows the prima facie
tort doctrine to expand the scope of protection for previously rec-
ogmzed interests as well as to protect new interests.
As noted above, neither the Restatement nor the New York
formulation, however, purports to subsume any other tort. Thus,
neither formulation has any significant potential to limit or reduce
the scope of liability The New York formulation, by its insistence
that the prima facie tort doctrine be purely mterstitial, 194 has so
reduced the scope of conduct to which the doctrine applies as to
render it almost irrelevant. 9' The Restatement formulation more
readily permits an expansion of liability. The courts applying the
Restatement formulation, however, generally have been sufficiently
conservative in their policy determinations with respect to the ele-
ments of injury and justification that the doctrine only occasionally
results in increased liability 196
Just as the prima facie tort doctrine will not lead in all cases to
an expansion of liability, an expansion of liability is not in all cases
undesirable. Courts long have recogmzed that novel claims should
not be disnssed merely because they are novel. 97 Even in the absence
of the prima facie tort doctrine, courts may expand liability by
creating an entirely new cause of action. 98 The objection to prima
"I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 870 comment j.
,,3 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
"94 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
,91 See supra note 162. The prima facie tort doctrine did not result in one reported
victory for New York plaintiffs during a two year period, despite its having been pleaded
in some 35 reported decisions during that period.
"96 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. For instances where the doctrine has
resulted in increased liability, see supra notes 30-54.
,97 Chapman v. Pickersgill, 95 E.R. 734, 7.35 (1762); see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536
P.2d 512, 514 (Or. 1975) (observing that it would avoid the "rigidities of existing causes
of action" by creating new torts when necessary).
I See, e.g., Nees, 536 P.2d at 512 (where the court decided that, to fill gaps, it
would create new torts as necessary, but explicitly declined to adopt prima facie tort as
one of those new torts).
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facie tort cannot be that it reopens the categories of tort liability
because, unquestionably, they have never closed. 19
Where liability is to be expanded, courts typically prefer to
broaden an existing tort rather than create a new one.2 The creation
of a new tort necessitates defining its elements and deciding its
relationship to other previously existing torts,20 1 a task largely avoided
where the court merely broadens an existing tort. The prima facie
tort doctrine provides just such an "existing tort" which, because of
the generality of its formulation, potentially can be applied to any
form of intentional harm, thus permitting new interests to be pro-
tected against intentional interference without the need to define new
causes of action.
CONCLUSION
The prima facie tort doctrine makes explicit the policy choices
that govern the determination whether to impose liability for the
intentional infliction of injury. At a minimum, the doctrine clarifies
the process that should determine whether a novel case will lead to
liability
Because intentional tort has occupied the outer boundary of tort
liability, the policy considerations underlying the decision whether to
recognize a new interest against interference often are addressed first
in the context of intentional tort. The adoption of a framework for
M' As the court explained in Greco v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988), "it is clear that modern legal thought considers that 'there exists a residue
of tort liability which has not been explicated in specific forms of tort action and which
is available for the courts to develop as common law tort actions as the needs of society
require such developments' (quoting Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). Accord Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 735 (N.M. 1990).
See generally Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 CoLUM. L. REv 1
(1927).
20 See, e.g., Bandag of Springfield, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 553
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("[i]f there are categories of legally protectible interests which are
now redressed, but inadequately so, the much preferable course is to revise traditional
doctrine so as to protect the interest which has gone unprotected.").
Justice Philip Halpern has noted that, "[t]here is a natural psychological barrier,
particularly at nisi prius, against the creation of new categories of tort liability, a barrier
which is not present when the question is put to the court in terms of applying a
recognized general principal of tort liability." Halpern, supra note 4, at 12.
20I See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1043 (Ariz.
1987) (en banc) (discussion of the elements of interference with contract); Porter, 611
S.W.2d at 267-72 (determining the elements of prima facie tort in Missouri); see also
Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of
Malice, supra note 4, at 1112 n.67
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addressing those considerations thus is not a trivial accomplishment.
At the same time, prima facie tort need not be understood as
having any particular ideological content. The frank recognition that
liability for intentional harm turns on considerations of policy does
not imply a preference for any particular set of results. Indeed, to
the extent that prima facie tort is recognized as the general theory
of liability for intentional harm, subsuming other intentional torts,
it presents an opportunity to roll back, or at least freeze, the borders
of tort liability for any court so inclined.
Prnma facie tort, in the final analysis, merely embodies in doc-
trinal form the fluidity of tort law. It serves as a constant reminder
that the category of interests that are protected against intentional
interference is not fixed, inevitable, or closed.

